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REASONABLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM FACTS SUBMITTED 
TO THE TRIAL COURT SUPPORT MRS. CHANG'S CLAIMS IN THIS 
CASE 1 
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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(k) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), in accordance 
with an order of the Utah Supreme Court dated February 3, 1993, 
which poured the case over to this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
REASONABLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM 
FACTS SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
SUPPORT MRS. CHANG'S CLAIMS IN THIS 
CASE. 
Appellees argue that the trial judge was correct in 
summarily dismissing Mrs. Chang's claims against them because Mr. 
Liu's actions were beyond their control, completely self-
motivated and outside the scope of his employment, authority and 
responsibility. In granting the Appellees' motion, the trial 
judge assumed the role of the trier of fact, weighed the evidence 
submitted and determined that the facts did not support Mrs. 
Chang's claims. In doing so, the trial court necessarily 
determined that no reasonable inferences could be drawn from the 
facts which would support Mrs. Chang's claims and that Mr. Liu's 
conduct was so clearly outside the scope of employment that 
reasonable minds could not differ. See e.g. Christensen v. Burns 
International Security Services, 844 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
The determination whether an employee is acting within the 
scope of employment is a question of fact. Id. The issue must 
be submitted to a jury whenever reasonable minds may differ as to 
whether the employee was at a certain time involved wholly or 
partly in the performance of the employer's business or within 
the scope of employment, id. In Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 
771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), it is explained: 
Whether there has been a deviation [from the scope of 
employment] so material or substantial as to constitute 
a complete departure is usually a question of fact. In 
some cases the deviation may be so marked, and in 
others so slight relatively, that the court can say 
that no conclusion other than that the act was or was 
not a departure could reasonably be supported . . . . 
Id. at 1057-58, bracket added, quoting Kruse v. White Bros., 253 
P. 178, 181 (Cal.App. 1927). 
Mrs. Chang submits that reasonable minds could differ as to 
whether Mr. Liu was wholly or partly in the performance of the 
Lins' and IID's business when he threatened, assaulted and 
battered her. Therefore, the issue must go to the jury. 
The conflicting interpretations the parties have put on the 
evidence in this case establishes that the evidence supports more 
than one conclusion. The trial judge erred in not allowing the 
case to be presented to the trier of fact. 
Appellees argue that the evidence in this case proves that 
Mrs. Chang's claims are without merit because there is no 
indication that Mr. Liu was in fact hired by IID and the Lins to 
harass, threaten, intimidate and ultimately batter Mrs. Chang. 
Nevertheless, contrary inferences are also possible, and where a 
choice of inferences is possible from summary judgment materials, 
the inferences must be drawn that favor the party resisting 
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summary judgment. Christensen v. Burns International Security 
Services, 844 P.2d 992, 933 (Utah App. 1992); Ledfors v. Emery 
County School Dist.. P.2d , No. 900503 (Utah, March 19, 
1993); Baldini v. Local U. No. 1095. 581 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 
1978) . Questions of motive, design and intent are particularly 
inappropriate for summary adjudication. Id. 
As was stated in Williams v. Borden. Inc.. 637 F.2d 731 
(10th Cir. 1980), 
. . . we are bound by the rule that the movant 
must demonstrate entitlement to a summary judgment 
. . . and if an inference can be deduced from the 
facts whereby the non-movant might recover, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. Where 
different ultimate inferences may be drawn from 
the subsidiary facts contained in the affidavits, 
attached exhibits, and depositions submitted below 
. . . the inferences . . . must be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment. 
Id. at 738, citations omitted. 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), 
holds that three factors must be met in order for the acts of an 
employee to be found within the scope of employment. First, an 
employee's conduct must be of the general kind the employee is 
employed to perform. As has been shown, when the Lins and IID 
needed a more coercive or intimidating interface with the Changs, 
Mr. Liu was used.1 He had threatened and abused Mrs. Chang on 
*In Mrs. Chang's principal brief and an addendum attached 
thereto, the facts and inferences, including references to the 
record, are set forth in detail. Therefore, they will not be 
repeated here. 
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the telephone, had attended meetings where he had no other 
purpose for being in attendance, even after the Changs objected 
to his presence, and ultimately he assaulted and battered Mrs. 
Chang. 
This evidence supports the inference that the Lins and IID, 
in fact, hired Mr. Liu to intimidate and harass the Changs. To 
satisfy the first factor, an employee's acts or conduct need 
merely be generally directed toward the accomplishment of the 
objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and 
authority, or reasonably incidental thereto. The employee need 
only be about the employer's business and the duties assigned by 
the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in a personal 
endeavor. Id. at 1057, emphasis added. 
Mr. Liu had no personal reason to threaten, assault and 
batter Mrs. Chang. And, he announced to Mrs. Chang that his acts 
were, "On behalf of this people . . . ." (R. 1318 at 100.) His 
only reason was to further the interests of the Lins and IID. He 
had previously issued a threat to Mrs. Chang in a telephone 
conversation and ultimately he followed through with that threat. 
Sandra Lin was aware of these incidents and after the assault and 
battery she told Mrs. Chang that, "she deserved it!" (R. 1318 at 
40 and 116.) Also, after the assault, when Mrs. Chang called 
Sandra Lin to ask why Mr. Liu had assaulted her, Sandra told Mrs. 
Chang that she and Clark Lin were coming over to pick up the 
check. (R. 1321 at 23-24.) This shows that the Lins were 
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determined to collect the money on that day, one way or another. 
In ler woi s, Mr. Liu was involved in the same objective as 
San.-ra Lin and Clark Lin. 
At the very least, some of Liu's motivation was to assist 
the Lins and IID. Although he denied that IID or the Lins told 
him to assault or batter Mrs. Chang, he admitted that his efforts 
were motivated by a desire to help Clark Lin get the Homestead 
payment 3.S soon as possible. (R. 1331 at 50-52, 63-67. )2 He 
also he visited Mrs. Chang because the Lins should have gotten 
the money that day. (R. 1331 at 65-66.) Therefore, Mrs. Chang 
has met the first element of the Birkner test. 
The second requirement is that the employee's conduct c cur 
within the hours of the employee's work in the ordinary spatial 
boundar"'es of the employment. The threats and assault occurred 
during working hours, and although the assault and battery 
occurred at Mrs. Chang's office, Mr. Liu's employment had no 
spatial boundary. Mr. Liu's duties included man "Ting and 
overseeing various properties owned by the Lins ~ad IID, 
therefore, it would be contemplated that he would have to travel 
around Salt Lake County in order to fulfill these obligations. 
He travelled to Mrs. Chang's office in an automobile he only had 
access to when he was at work. (R. 1331 at 78.) Mrs. Chang has 
2Although Sandra Lin and Clark Lin testified that she asked 
Mr. Liu to call the Changs regarding the balloon payment, (R. 
1330 at 48 and 867 at 1 13), Mr. Liu denied this. (R. 1331 at 
51.) Appellees have not explained this inconsistency. 
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submitted evidence to support the second prong of the Birkner 
test. 
The third prong is that the employee's conduct must be 
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the 
employer's interests. This means that, regardless of whether the 
employee's intent is misguided in its means, its purpose must be 
to further the employer's business interests. Everyone involved 
in this case admits that Mr. Liu's intent was misguided in its 
means. There can be no doubt that he had his employer's 
interests at heart, both when he threatened and when he assaulted 
and battered Mrs. Chang. He has admitted as much. (R. 1331 at 
50-52, 65-67.) 
The evidence in this case supports the inferences urged by 
Mrs. Chang and the trial court erred in granting Appellee's 
motion for summary judgment. 
Appellees rely on the cases of Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 
Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910 (1963); Barney v. Jewel Tea Co.. 104 
Utah 292, 296, 139 P.2d 878, 879 (1943); and Keller v. Gunn 
Supply Co., 62 Utah 501, 220 P. 1063 (1923), in each of which the 
Utah Supreme Court declined to find that batteries committed by 
employees were committed within the scope of employment. (Brief 
of Appellees at 15.) They argue that because the acts in those 
cases were unprovoked, highly unusual and quite outrageous, that 
the employer was not responsible. 
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In this case, Mrs. Chang admitted that she felt the attack 
upon her by Mr. Liu was unprovoked, highly unusual and quite 
outrageous. Appellees cite this testimony to support the trial 
court's dismissal of Mrs. Chang's claims. However, these cases 
do not hold that if the victim of a tortious act believes that 
the act is unprovoked, highly unusual and outrageous, there can 
be no liability on the basis of respondeat superior. It would 
indeed be rare when the victim of an assault and battery would 
not believe that such acts were "unprovoked, highly unusual and 
quite outrageous." 
The obvious relevance of this discussion in the cases is 
that if the acts are unprovoked, highly unusual and quite 
outrageous when contrasted to the acts for which the employee was 
hired or directed by the employer, then there can be no liability 
under respondeat superior.3 
This case is not a situation where a bill collector was 
attempting routine collection matters when an argument ensued and 
then escalated into a situation where the employee ultimately 
assaulted and battered the object of the collection efforts, as 
3This element, as explained in Birkner, was drawn from W. 
Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Tcrts, § 70, at 506 (5th 
ed. 1984) which reads in full: 
Where the conduct of the servant is u:, rovoked, highly 
unusual, and quite outrageous, there has been something 
of a tendency to find that thi? in itself is sufficient 
to indicate that the motive was a purely personal one, 
but it seems clear that this cannot hold true in all 
cases. 
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in Barney. Nor is it like Stone where an employee of a lumber 
company battered a company customer because the customer had 
voiced dissatisfaction over the way the employee had dumped a 
load of lumber. Oddly, the court concluded that the employee's 
acts could not have been committed in furtherance of the 
company's business because the battery was committed after the 
delivery had been made. 386 P.2d at 911. Nor is it like Keller 
where a chef in a restaurant battered a customer who he thought 
had offended his wife. Barney, Stone, and Keller are all cases 
where an employee performing routine functions got into disputes 
with customers which escalated into an assault and battery. 
Of course the law cannot impose liability on employers for 
the acts of employees in such circumstances. The would be no way 
for employers to manage such a risk. However, when employees are 
given responsibilities, where it is likely or foreseeable that 
tortious conduct could result, employers can be held responsible. 
For example, in Beggerly v. Walker, 397 P.2d 395 (Kan. 1964), it 
was held that a club owner could be vicariously liable for an 
assault and battery committed by a club employee on a club 
patron. In so holding the Supreme Court of Kansas states: 
Where the nature of the employment or the duty imposed 
on an employee is such that the employer must 
contemplate the use of force by the employee as a 
natural or legitimate sequence, the employer will be 
held liable for the wilful or malicious act of his 
employee even though he had no knowledge that the act 
was to be done and although the act was in disobedience 
of express order or instructions given by him. 
Generally, where the employment contemplates some use 
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of force, niceties of distinction are not indulged in 
to determine whether the use of excessive force was 
motivated by personal reasons . . . 
Id. at 399. See also. Sage Club v. Hunt. 638 P.2d 161 (Wyo. 
1981), and Jones v. Herr, 594 P.2d 410 (Ore. App. 1979). 
The facts in this case support an inference that Mr. Liu 
visited Mrs. Chang for the express purpose of intimidating, 
threatening and harassing her. Mr. Liu had no other reason for 
visiting Mrs. Chang. When Mr. Liu arrived at Mrs. Chang's office 
he announced, "On behalf of this people, today I'm only giving 
you a taste [there] will be more colorful ones to come." (R. 
1318 at 100.) He testified that his reasons for visiting Mrs. 
Chang on the day he assaulted her was to obtain payment or exact 
justice for these people (IID and the Lins). (R. 1331 at 65-67.) 
Mr. Liu paid this visit to Mrs. Chang even though he was present 
when Clark Lin had been informed that the check had been placed 
in the mail, so there was no collection that could have occurred 
at the Changs' office that day. This case is much different from 
Stone, Barney and Keller, where a normal business task escalates 
into a fight. 
Since the opinions in Stone. Barney and Keller, the Supreme 
Court of Utah has made clear that a master can be liable for 
intentional torts of employees, including assault, fraud and 
defamation, Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1057, nt. 
2 (Utah 1989). The inferences to be drawn from the evidence that 
Mr. Liu was hired by the Lins and IID in order to threaten, 
-9-
coerce and harass the Changs establishes that the ultimate act of 
assault and battery upon Mrs. Chang was not "unprovoked, highly 
unusual and quite outrageous" and that reasonable minds might 
differ whether or not Mr. Liu was wholly or partly in the 
performance of his employer's business at the time of the 
assault. Id. at 1057. 
APPELLEES' VERSION OF THE FACTS IS 
DISPUTED IN THE RECORD. 
In addition to the disputed material facts which are pointed 
out in Mrs. Chang's principal brief, in both the body of the 
brief and Addendum B thereto, the following assertions by 
Appellees, are, in fact, disputed, and contradicted by the 
evidence: 
1. Appellees claim that Dr. Clark Lin was a vice-president 
and financial officer of IID. (Appellees' Brief at 5.) This is 
misleading because at the material times in this case, Michael 
Liu was a vice-president and the chief financial officer of IID. 
(R. 1331 at 13; 1330 at 19-20, 36.) Mr. Liu's authority to act 
for IID was at least as great as Clark Lin's. 
2. Appellees claim that although Sandra Lin and her 
husband, Ming Cheng Lin, did not discuss business in their 
frequent telephone calls. (Appellees' Brief at 6.) Sandra Lin 
testified that she discussed all important decisions regarding 
their businesses with her husband. (R. 1321 at 66.) Sandra Lin 
also testified that the Homestead distribution was a very 
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important decision, although she then denied discussing it with 
her husband. (R. 1321 at 66-67.) This evidence supports an 
inference that Mr. Lin was advised of the events of which Mrs. 
Chang complains. 
3. Appellees claim that Liu never had any collection 
responsibilities for IID. (Appellees' Brief at 7.) While this 
may technically be true, it is clear that Mr. Liu was at least 
periodically called upon to engage in collection efforts for some 
of the Lins' other businesses, even though Appellees have taken 
the position that Mr. Liu did not work fcr the Lins or their 
other businesses. Specifically, Sandra Lin directed Mr. Liu to 
telephone Mrs. Chang to inquire when the Homestead distribution 
would be made to the Lins. (R. 1320 at 54; 1330 at 47-48.) 
Mr. Liu was also asked to attend partnership meetings which 
were called to discuss the distribution. Mr. Liu had no reason 
to attend those meetings, if his employment only involved being 
an investment manager and consultant for IID, as Appellees 
contend. (Appellees' Brief at 6.) IID did not have any interest 
in the Homestead distribution so Liu had no reason to be involved 
-- unless his responsibilities and scope of employment were 
larger than Appellees have been willing to admit. As late as 
August 1990, several months after the attack, Mr. Liu, on behalf 
of the Lins, whom Appellees claim he never worked for, 
corresponded with Mrs. Chang relative to one of the partnerships 
in which the Lins and Changs were involved. (R. 1322, Exhibit 
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9.) This evidence supports the inference that Mr. Liu, in fact, 
had collection responsibilities for both IID and the Lins. 
4. Appellees claim that after Mr. Liu had threatened Mrs. 
Chang on the telephone and promised her that there was more to 
come, Clark Lin told Mr. Liu not to have "further contact" with 
Changs unless he was directed to do so. (Appellees' Brief at 
7.) It is undisputed that after that request, Mr. Liu attended 
meetings where Mrs. Chang was to be present (until she learned 
Mr. Liu would be there so she declined to attend). He also 
visited her on the day of the assault and battery. Based upon 
this evidence, it can be inferred that the visit was pursuant to 
a directive because he, in fact, had "further contact" with her. 
5. Appellees admit that, at their request, Mr. Liu 
attended the Homestead partnership meeting on January 31, 1990. 
They claim he was only "to witness what occurred there." 
(Appellees' Brief at 7.)4 They claim he took no part in the 
meeting other than to listen. However, Sandra Lin told Mr. Chang 
that Mr. Liu was there to represent her husband through a power 
of attorney. (R. 1315 at 138.) 
4Appellees do not explain why they needed Mr. Liu to witness 
what was to occur at that meeting when both Sandra Lin and Clark 
Lin were in attendance and partnership counsel was also there. 
Mrs. Chang submits that these facts, when coupled with the other 
facts of this case, support the inference that Mr. Liu was 
brought to the meeting by Sandra Lin and Clark Lin to intimidate 
the Changs. Fortunately Mrs. Chang declined to attend the 
meeting when she learned Mr. Liu would attend. 
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6. Appellees claim that Read Hellewell, an attorney with 
Appellees' current counsels' firm, and who was IID's attorney at 
the time, did not charge Mr. Liu for the legal services he 
provided Mr. Liu in connection with the criminal proceedings that 
resulted from the battery. (Appellees' Brief at 9.) However, Liu 
testified that Hellewell was paid by IID and he was to pay IID 
back. (R. 1331 at 81.) Clark Lin testified that either Liu or 
IID paid Mr. Hellewell. (R. 1330 at 105-106.) What is clear 
however, is that IID and the Lins originally arranged for Mr. 
Hellewell to represent Liu because, "Hellewell has been working 
for us for a long time. . . ." (Id.) Thus, the evidence 
supports the inference that the Lins and IID condoned Mr. Liu's 
actions by having their longtime lawyer represent him, whether he 
was paid or not. 
7. Appellees claim that neither IID nor the Lins had any 
reason to believe that Mr. Liu might pose a danger to anyone. 
(Appellees' Brief at 10.) However, Clark Lin testified that when 
Mr. Liu left for Chang's office he called Mrs. Chang to "alert" 
her. (R. 1330 at 88.) If there was no reason to believe that 
Mr. Liu was dangerous, why did Clark Lin try to alert Mrs. Chang? 
Clark Lin also testified that he brought Mr. Liu to the January 
31 meeting to show the Changs that Liu was not a "menacing 
person." (R. 1330 at 47.) It is clear Appellees were aware of 
the Changs' fears about Mr. Liu. This evidence supports the 
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inference that the assault and battery were foreseeable and that 
Appellees were aware of what Mr. Liu might do. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Mrs. Chang requests that 
the summary judgment of June 10, 1992 of the Third District Court 
be reversed and the case be remanded for trial. 
DATED this of March, 1992. 
SNOW,^CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
H^ rdlti G. Chris 
R. Br4nt Steph* 
RyanVE. Tibbitts 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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